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I. INTRODUCTION

Factor VIII is a protein within the human body that regulates the
normal coagulation and clotting of blood.! Individuals suffering from
a deficiency of the protein are prone to acute incidences of excessive
bleeding which often can result in death.2 This condition is known as
hemophilia.3
In the early 1980s, a concentrated form of Factor VIII was marketed
which was produced from the pooled plasma of 2000 to 30,000 donors
per lot.4 The commercial concentrate was much more effective than the
previously available treatment, a cryoprecipitate of which each bag was
produced from the plasma of one donor.5 This advance in technology
resulted in great benefits for hemophiliacs, including reduced hospital
admissions and safer surgical treatment of other conditions.6 In addition,
hemophiliacs enjoyed greater independence because they could
administer the concentrate to themselves at home.7
At the time this product was marketed, however, blood products were
known to transmit hepatitis, a virus that causes liver disease.' The risk
of contracting the disease from the concentrate was much higher than
from previous products because of the exposure to thousands of donors
with each treatment.' Despite the risk that one percent to ten percent of
recipients would become infected with hepatitis, the product continued
to be produced, prescribed, and used. 0
In 1982, evidence began to appear indicating that hemophiliacs were
at risk of contracting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)"

1. See Jane R Desforges, AIDS andPreventive Treatment in Hemophilia,308 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 94, 94 n.1 (1983); Eric Nauenberg & Sean D. Sullivan, Firm Behavior in the U.S.
Market for Factor VIII: A Need for Policy?, 39 Soc. SCi. & MED. 1591, 1591 (1994).
2. Nauenberg & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1591.
3. See id. Approximately 20,000 American men are hemophiliacs. Id.
4. See THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE §§ 1.12-4 to 1.12-5 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed.
1994).
5. See Desforges, supra note 1, at 95. The cryoprecipitate containing this protein was
discovered in 1964. See id. at 94 n.2.
6. See id. at 94.
7. See id.
8. See id.; N.C. Hughes-Jones, Risk Assessment and Factor VIII Concentrates, 345 THE
LANCET 502, 502 (1995) (stating that the transmission of infectious agents by transfusion is well
known and the resultant mortality well documented).
9. See Desforges, supra note 1, at 94-95.
10. See Hughes-Jones, supra note 8, at 502.
11. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 721 n.4 (Haw. 1991); Centers for
Disease Control, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Persons with Hemophilia A, 31
MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 365, 365-67 (1982).
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from blood products contaminated with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV). 2 Some contemporaneous medical articles encouraged
hemophiliacs to continue using the products because the authors
perceived only a slight risk. 3 Other articles urged a reevaluation of the
safety of factor concentrates and suggested returning to single-donor
cryoprecipitate. 4 However, Factor VIII concentrates continued to be
produced in great quantities. In 1986, procedures including rejecting
donors in high-risk categories, screening other donors, and heat-treating
to inactivate the HIV were implemented 5 which almost completely
eradicated the virus from the concentrates. 6 By that time, however,
approximately seventy percent of hemophiliacs in the United States
suffering from Factor VIII deficiency had been infected with IV. 7
AIDS, like herpes, smallpox, yellow fever, and hepatitis, is an infectious disease caused by
a virus. ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., AIDS LAW INA NUTSHELL 1 (1996) [hereinafter NUTSHELL].
The disease was first identified in 1981. NUTSHELL, supra, at 4. There was evidence as early as
1982 that hemophiliacs had contracted AIDS, and by 1984 there was a general consensus that
it was transmissible through blood products. See Smith, 823 P.2d at 721 n.4. Other modes of
transmission include sexual intercourse, use of infected syringes, blood and organ donations,
child birth and breast feeding. NUTSHELL, supra, at 8-9. AIDS is an incurable and fatal disease,
with possible symptoms ranging from fatigue, weight loss, skin irritation, and swollen lymph
nodes to dementia, deterioration of the immune system, Kaposi's sarcoma, Pneumocystis Carinii
Pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Id. at 15-17.
There are many legal issues surrounding AIDS, its victims, and health care providers. See,
e.g., DONALD H.J. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, LEGAL AsPECTS OF AIDS (1991)
(discussing, inter alia, liability for sexual transmission and privacy and defamation issues);
MARK S. SENAK, HIV, AIDS, AND THE LAW (1996) (discussing, inter alia, federal and state
entitlement benefits available to and employment discrimination against persons with HIV or
AIDS); Diane A. Tomlinson, Physicianswith AIDS and TheirDuty to Patients,43 FLA. L. REV.
561 (1991) (discussing the duty of health care providers to disclose their HIV-positive status to
their patients).
12. HIV is an RNA virus characterized by integration into host cells in animals and
humans. HIV infection proceeds through depletion of T-lymphocytes or T-helper white blood
cells, which are specialized infection-fighting cells. This breakdown leads to extreme weakening
of the body's immune system. Hermann & Schurgin, supra note 11, § 1:05, at 1-7.
13. See, e.g., Hughes-Jones, supra note 8, at 502 (quoting L. Fraser, Need for FactorVIII
Outweighs AIDS Risk, GENERAL PRACTTIONER, Oct. 19, 1984, at 3).
14. See, e.g., Desforges, supra note 1, at 95.
15. See Cohen, supra note 4, § 1.12-5; Paul M. Rowe, U.S. Inquiry into HIV in Blood
Products, 344 THE LANcET 876, 876 (1994).
16. See Cohen, supra note 4, § 1.12-5.
17. See Centers for Disease Control, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the
United States, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 801, 801-02 (1987).
Thousands of hemophiliacs in France, Switzerland, Canada, and other countries also have
been infected by Factor VIII concentrates. In France, three senior health officials were
imprisoned for distributing the HIV-contaminated clotting products. Kate Dunn, HIV and
Canada's Hemophiliacs:Looking Back at a Tragedy, 148 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 609, 609
(1993); see also Rowe, supra note 15, at 876. TheCanadian government created a Commission
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Recently, as patients have begun to discover their conditions through
HIV testing or development of AIDS symptoms, they or their families
also have begun to bring suits against the manufacturers of Factor VIII
concentrates based on negligence, strict liability, breach of implied
warranty, or other theories. However, most courts that have considered
the strict liability and warranty claims 8 have barred them under
so-called blood shield statutes 9 enacted in almost all states. 20

of Inquiry to investigate why so many hemophiliacs became infected, Hughes-Jones, supra note
8, at 502, and established a compensation scheme for the victims, see Dunn, supra,at 609. The
U.S. National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine als6 has launched a similar
investigation. Hughes-Jones, supra note 8, at 502; Rowe, supra note 15, at 876.
18. Strict liability claims for product-related injuries are usually brought under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977), which provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
19. For example, the California blood shield statute provides:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood, plasma, blood
products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the same,
or any of them, into the human body shall be construed to be, and is declared to
be, for all purposes whatsoever, the rendition of a service by each and every
person, firm, or corporation participating therein, and shall not be construed to be,
and is declared not to be, a sale of such whole blood, plasma, blood products, or
blood derivatives, for any purpose or purposes whatsoever.
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §

1606 (West 1995).

By defining acts related to blood injections and transfusions as "services" instead of as
product sales, the statute renders RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A inapplicable and
therefore bars strict liability claims. Hermann, supra note 11, at 3-14.
20. See Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No-Cause" Liability in Blood
ProductsLitigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107, (1995); see also Hermann, supra note 11, at 3-14.
The few states that have not passed blood shield statutes usually hold that these products fall
under the "unavoidably unsafe products" exception in comment k following § 402A. Hermann,
supra note 11, at 3-12. That comment provides:
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In traditional negligence claims,2' the cause-in-fact element' poses
an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs injured by mass-produced drugs
like Factor VIL.' In products liability, this general negligence causation requirement translates into a showing that the defendant was the
manufacturer of the product that actually caused the injury.24 This is a
problem for Factor VIII plaintiffs because of the nature of the disease,
interchangeability of the products, use of the products of more than one
manufacturer, and other reasons.
Some courts have adopted theories such as concert of action,
alternative, enterprise, and market share theories of liability which relax

There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for
the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and
damaging consequences when it is injected. ... Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous.... The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is
given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use....

§ 402A comment k (1977).
This exception is a bit of a strict liability-negligence hybrid, requiring that appropriate
warning be given before it applies. The application of this exception in Factor VIII cases is
inappropriate because the claims are usually based on failure to warn, failure to exclude
high-risk donors, and failure to screen other donors. Implementation of these procedures would
have rendered the products safe with no reduction in effectiveness. In addition, other less
dangerous treatments, albeit less effective and convenient, were known at the time.
21. The four elements of a successful traditional negligence claim are (1) a legal duty
requiring the defendant to meet a certain standard to protect a person from an unreasonable risk
of harm, (2) breach of this duty, (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiff's injury, which includes notions of cause-in-fact and proximate cause, and (4) actual
loss or damage to the plaintiff's interest. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
22. The causation requirement may be stated as follows: "In order that a negligent actor
shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary not only that the actor's conduct be negligent
toward the other, but also that the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430. Restatement § 431 discusses one formulation of what
constitutes legal cause: "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a)
his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in
the harm." KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 41, at 266. Another formulation of legal cause is
the "but foe or "sine qua non" rule, which states that "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of
the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's
conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it. Id.
23. See Klein, supra note 20, at 108.
24. KEETON ET AL, supra note 21, § 103, at 713.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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the causation requirements in products liability cases.25 However, most
courts have adhered to traditional negligence law in these cases,
including Factor VIII cases, holding that the plaintiff's inability to show
causation precludes any recovery.26 In doing so, these courts have
denied the HIV-positive plaintiffs even compensatory damages.
Intertwined with the legal issues in these cases are public policy
issues that weigh heavily on courts in determining whether to adopt or
expand theories of liability for new cases such as those involving Factor
VIII. First, although courts want to serve justice in individual product
liability cases and encourage development and distribution of safe and
effective products, they fear that doctrinal expansion may greatly
increase liability and litigation costs incurred by pharmaceutical
companies, which could result in adverse social consequences including
unavailability of important new or existing drugs, increased prices of
drugs, and decreased international competitiveness of United States
pharmaceutical companies. Second, in the face of social, industrial,

25. See, e.g., Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp, 696 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(applying alternative liability to a Factor VIII case); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (developing and applying enterprise liability theory in a
blasting cap case); $indell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (developing and applying
market-share liability theory in a diethylstilbesterol (DES) case), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 175-76 (Mich. 1984) (applying concert of
action theory and alternative liability theory in a DES case), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
DES is a synthetic compound of estrogen, a female hormone. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925. It
was prescribed to prevent miscarriage in pregnant women from the early 1940s to the early
1970s. Id. It is now known to cause adenocarcinoma, which involves cancerous vaginal and
cervical growths, in the daughters of women who took it. Id. It also causes adenosis, a condition
involving precancerous vaginal and cervical growths which can spread to other parts of the body.
These conditions did not manifest themselves until around 10 or 12 years after exposure to the
drug. Id. The treatment for these conditions is radical surgery, and women with the condition
must endure painful follow-up examinations twice a year. Id.
26. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in
Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 941, 965 (1985).
27. This climate of fear was probably fostered by a tort insurance crisis in the mid-1980s,
which involved a tripling of general product liability insurance premiums, resulting from the
perception that there had been a tort litigation explosion. See 1 A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY,
ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 3 (1991). General product liability
premiums increased from $6.5 billion to $19 billion in just three years. See id.Although in
retrospect the perception of a crisis seems to have been unfounded, courts remain apprehensive,
and tort reformers continue to explore alternatives to tort law for dealing with product-related
injuries. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986). But see Donald G. Gifford et al., Litigation Trends in Florida:Saga of a Growth State,
39 U. FLA. L. REv. 829 (1987) (stating that litigation did increase significantly in Florida); R.
Kyle Gavin, Note, The Constitutionalityof Florida'sCap on Noneconomic Damages in the Tort
Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 157, 192 (1987) (concluding that
Florida's $450,000 noneconomic damages cap is constitutional and could impact the "insurance
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and regulatory change, courts are uncertain of the appropriate relationship between tort law and other institutions, such as market forces and
government regulation, in striking a balance among these interests. 8
The purpose of this Note is to develop a systematic approach to
product-related injury cases, specifically Factor VIfl cases, that balances
all of the interests at stake, including (1) providing compensation for
injured plaintiffs, (2) encouraging drug safety and effectiveness, (3)
ensuring availability of new and existing drugs, (4) keeping drug prices
reasonable, and (5) maintaining international competitiveness of United
States pharmaceutical companies.29
In order to examine the interconnected issues involved in achieving
these goals, it is first necessary to consider each facet individually. To
this end, part II provides background information on the pharmaceutical
industry including the industry's decisionmaking process, which is the
mechanism through which product liability law, market forces, and
governmental regulation act to achieve the desired interests. Part III of
the Note traces the historical development of the potentially applicable
tort law theories in order to facilitate a better appreciation of their
respective approaches in tackling product liability cases. Part IV
evaluates the soundness of these theories in terms of the policies
involved in Factor VIII cases and other similar cases, while part V
formulates a practicable approach to Factor VIII and similar cases.

crisis"); David J. Nye et al., The Myth of a Liability Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41
VAND. L. REv. 909 (1988) (observing that a claims explosion did not occur from 1981-1984).
28. See generally Note, A Question of Competence: The JudicialRole in the Regulation
of Pharmaceuticals,103 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1990) (criticizing the current FDA regulation
system and arguing in favor of FDA preemption of tort claims based on design defects or
inadequate warnings).
29. Although maintaining international competitiveness of U.S. industries is a valid
interest, it will receive little direct attention in this Note for two reasons. First, it appears that
currently the industry has no real reason to complain about its economic competitiveness. It has
been one of the most profitable industries in the United States for many years. U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 26
(Theodore W. Schlie ed., 1986). In additi6n, as of 1982, 11 of the top 20 pharmaceutical
companies worldwide were U.S. companies, with West Germany and Switzerland lagging far
behind in second place with three of the top companies each. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra, at
2. Second, most economists agree that the competitive focus should be on maintaining a rising
standard of living for Americans, and not necessarily obtaining certain international trade results,
although the latter may be one way to achieve the former. STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY
AND THE ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 12 (1993). However,
because the introduction of new drugs into the market and the quality and reputation of drugs
are important factors in a company's international competitiveness, the analyses and
recommendations contained in this Note for encouraging innovation, availability, safety, and
effectiveness of new drugs also will enhance international competitiveness.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

7

REVIEW
FLORIDA
Florida
Law LAW
Review,
Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2

[Vol. 48

II. BACKGROUND OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

The pharmaceutical industry is not a single market, but rather is
comprised of a wide variety of markets and submarkets, ranging from
biologicals and blood fractions to prescription and over-the-counter
medicines to nontherapeutic care products.3" Many pharmaceutical
products are patented,3' giving the patentee exclusive production and
marketing rights for twenty years. 2
Pharmaceutical companies engage in three main types of production.
First, they create completely new drugs through innovative research with
relatively unknown compounds and substances." Second, aside from
developing their own innovative products, companies also engage in
production of "me too" drugs: when a chemical or biological compound
or substance is determined to have valuable physiological effects, the
developer's competitors experiment in making slight changes to the
compound in an effort to find a patentable variation of it for the original
use or other uses. 4 Third, generic versions of drugs are produced and
sold after the patents on their brand-name counterparts expire."
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable manufacturing industries in the United States. 6 Its high pricing of products
needed for public health 7 and its very high and consistent profits, as
30. See

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note

29, at 1.

31. See id.

32. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). However, at the time that Factor VIII concentrates were
being produced, the patent term was 17 years. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
33. See id. at 11; GARBER, supra note 29, at 24.
34. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 11-12; GARBER, supra note 29, at 24. The

introduction of valuable new drugs to the market, whether developed through innovation or the
"me too" strategy, is the most important factor in a company's long-term profitability. Id. at 2122. Often, an overwhelming percentage of a company's profits come from just a handful of
"blockbuster" drugs. Id. at 20. In addition, it appears that the first company to introduce a drug
maintains the largest share of the market even after other companies begin to sell the same drug
or a very similar drug. Id. at 22.
35. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 11.
36. See id. at 26.

37. Elevated price is a function of two factors. First, it is well documented that there is
little or no price competition among pharmaceutical companies. See GARBER, supra note 29, at
19. Second, the demand for such products is inelastic, in other words, the demand does not vary
with price. Id. There are several reasons for inelastic demand in this industry: (1) people with
serious conditions will pay almost anything for effective drugs, (2) many products have no real
substitute, (3) physicians prescribing the medications are not concerned or aware of the cost or
of substitutes, and (4) patients are not overly concerned with cost because either public or
private insurance will reimburse them for a substantial portion of the cost. See id. at 19 n.25.
The combination of lack of price competition and inelastic demand can result in a
profit-maximizing price that is several times the production cost. Id. at 19. In addition, unlike
many other countries, the United States does not directly regulate the price of drugs. Id. at 17
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compared to other industries, have drawn a great deal of criticism
against the industry for purportedly engaging in anticompetitive
behavior." In addition to high prices and high profits, the industry has
exhibited other anticompetitive characteristics. Indeed, in the Factor
VIII submarket itself, there has been evidence of oligopolistic trade
practices.'

n.18, 20.

38. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 26; see also Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES
and a ProposedTheory of EnterpriseLiability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 975-76 (1978) (citing
Senate Subcomm. on Monopoly, Select Comm. on Small Business, Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (Comm. Print 1972)). Sheiner notes:
In a 1972 report to Congress, it was emphasized that the drug industry was
"practically unique" in that "[l]osses, or even low profits, are practically unheard
of among large drug companies." Although the pharmaceutical manufacturers
justify their profits by the extreme risk inherent in the development of new drugs,
critics have recognized an inherent contradiction in the coexistence of high risks
and consistently high, industrywide profits. Such risks would result in at least
"occasional losses" to some firms.
Sheiner, supra,at 975-76 (footnotes omitted); see also Nauenberg, supra note 3, at 1592 (stating
that "[m]arket performance results suggest that the industry generates high profit margins,
selectively restricts supply, and practices price discrimination"). The classic explanation for
implicit collusion is that "firms recognize the mutual benefit of sustaining a monopoly price
without explicit collusion. The threat of a price war reducing profits to zero is sufficient to deter
the incentive to cut prices in an attempt to capture the market for oneself." Id. at 1594.
39. Besides high profits and lack of price competition, another measure of a market's
competitiveness is firm concentration ratios, which indicate the potential for coordination and
collusion. See Nauenberg, supra note 3, at 1592. A firm concentration ratio indicates the
percentage of market share occupied by a certain number of firms. See id. At first glance, the
pharmaceutical industry may appear competitive because the overall firm concentration levels
for the entire industry are fairly low. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that
the "U.S. drug industry is highly competitive, with no firm accounting for more than 8 percent
of total sales"). However, firm concentration ratios within submarkets provide a more realistic
view of competition because it is within submarkets that collusion is most likely to take place.
Nauenberg, supra note 3, at 1592. These firm concentration ratios can prove to be very high.
For example, "[t]he unweighted average of the four-firm concentration ratio for eighteen
therapeutic markets was 68% in 1968 with values ranging from 46% for digestive enzymes to
93% for diabetic therapies and 95% for antiarthritic medications." Id.
In addition, pharmaceutical firms use "frivolous patent litigation and petitions to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) to limit competition and market entry." Lars Noah, Sham
Petitioningas a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process,74 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995)
(proposing changes in agency procedures to combat these tactics).
40. Factor VIII concentrates have been supplied by four manufacturers since the 1970s
including Miles Inc. (Cutter Laboratories), Rhone-Poulenc Rorer (Armour Pharmaceuticals),
Green Cross (Alpha Therapeutics), and Baxter Healthcare (Hyland), New York Blood Center,
and, until recently, the American Red Cross. Nauenberg, supra note 3, at 1592. "Thus, strictly
from a four-firm concentration ratio perspective, the market is highly concentrated." Id.On
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A. Decisionmaking in the PhannaceuticalIndustry
Industrial decisionmakers are primarily concerned, of course, with
maximizing profits.4 ' Profits are the difference between revenues
received and costs incurred.42 When a company is considering a
proposed course of action, for example, placing a new drug on the
market or withdrawing a drug already on the market, it must estimate
the costs associated with the action. These costs may be broken down
into two categories.43 Direct costs are those that can be directly traced
and accounted for, such as the amount paid in court judgments and
settlements.' Although companies generally carry insurance to cover
another scale of market concentration, the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index, the Factor VIII
submarket is at the 95th percentile for concentration, which means that only 5% of U.S.
industries are more concentrated. Id
In addition, in the late 1980s the Factor VIII submarket behaved contrary to the economic
law of supply and demand, which states that in a normal market the quantity of a good supplied
in the market tends to meet the quantity of the good demanded, resulting in market equilibrium
in which there is neither a surplus or shortage of the good. See ROY J. RUFFIN & PAUL R.
GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 78-79 (3d ed. 1988). In 1987, when it was known
that many hemophiliacs had been infected with HIV from contaminated Factor VIII concentrates,
the industry began to produce intermediate purity factor concentrates which had been pasteurized
to render the virus inactive. See Nauenberg, supra note 3, at 1593. These products were followed
in 1988 by high purity products, which were even safer and more effective therapies produced
through a monoclonal antibody purification process. See id. at 1594. Because the high purity
products were very expensive, there remained a great demand for the intermediate purity
products by hemophiliacs who already had been infected with HIV. See id. Only a small portion
of this demand was met by the Factor VIII manufacturers, leaving a very large percentage of
an approximately $182 million market unclaimed. See id. The most likely explanation for this
is inter-product collusion resulting in exclusion of the less profitable intermediate purity product:
Inter-product collusion is not based on coordinated price decisions among players
in the cartel but rather on the joint determination of production and price decisions
by members. In the market for Factor VIII, the manufacturers of high purity
products are also the manufacturers of intermediate purity products all of which are
still under patent protection. Given this protection, manufacturers did not fear entry
by other firms when they coordinated a decrease in production of intermediate
purity product simultaneous with the introduction of high purity product. These
high purity products were significantly more refined than their predecessors, a
difference which could justify assignment of higher prices. Given all of these
contingencies, it may have been possible for manufacturers to coordinate
production and substitute the more profitable high purity product for the
intermediate purity product.
Id. at 1594.
41. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 16.
42. Id. at 34.
43. See id. at 34-35.
44. See id. at 35.
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at least a portion of these costs, there is a trend toward self-insurance.4"
In addition, when a commercial insurance company pays an adverse
judgment, future premiums often increase." Indirect costs are less
tangible, including loss of reputation resulting in a drop in stock prices
or closer regulatory scrutiny.47 These indirect costs cannot be insured
against externally."
Estimating direct and indirect costs is somewhat speculative. The
main determinants are risk and uncertainty.49 Risk is the cost that a
company estimates it will incur as a result of a certain action. 0
Uncertainty is the variance in the range of possible risk; it is an estimate
of how wrong the company could be about its risk figure. 1 Because
any reasonable amount of risk can be insured against, industrial
decisionmakers
and insurers have the most difficulty with the uncertain52
ty element.
B. Forces Affecting the Decisionmaking Process
At least three outside influences significantly affect decisionmaking
within the pharmaceutical industry: market forces, governmental
regulation, and the potential for product liability. Each of these
influences comprises a system that may be used to achieve the goals
regarded as valuable by courts that have decided the outcomes of mass
tort cases.
1. Market Forces
Ideally, market forces should allow consumers to make informed
choices about how much risk they are willing to accept and at what

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See iat at 56.
See id. at 61; 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 86.
See GARBER, supra note 29, at 61; 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 86.
51. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 61; 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 86.
52. See I A.L.I., supra note 27, at 86.
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price. 3 However, in practice this system is far from perfect because
consumers do not have complete information.
Market forces affect economic decisionmaking in the pharmaceutical
industry in the same way that they affect it in other industries. The
potential for profitability, primarily determined by demand, drives the
decision of whether to introduce a new product into the market.
Withdrawal of a product already on the market depends partly on
whether the continued demand of a defective product will result in
continued profitability despite the costs that will be incurred as a result
of the defect.5 Generally, the profit-maximizing price is primarily
determined by what consumers are willing to pay and by price competition. 6 However, in the pharmaceutical industry there is very little price
competition. 7
2. Governmental Regulation
Governmental regulation is often cited as one of the most significant
factors in the pharmaceutical industry's decisionmaking 8 The goal of
53. Id. at 203-04.
It is important to remember that however attractive safety may be in the abstract,
making products safer is costly and may detract from their performance. Cars could
be made almost collision-proof if their exteriors were of thick steel or ceramic, but
then they would both be very expensive and perform like tanks. To the extent that
consumers prefer less safety, lower cost, and higher performance over the reverse
of these attributes, a well functioning market will supply comparatively hazardous
cars. A commitment to market solutions implies a commitment to accepting the
possibility of a consumer choice "against" safety.
Id. at 204.
There are two primary justifications for allowing consumers to make such a choice. First,
a utilitarian theory holds that legal rules should produce the best state of affairs in society, in
other words, maximize the utility of people. Utilitarians generally believe that individuals can
best determine how to maximize their own utility. Id. at 205-06. Second, the moral philosophy
of Immanuel Kant asserts that individuals are to be treated as ends in themselves, not as means
to an end. Thus, treating people with the requisite respect under this philosophy would include
permitting people to make their own choices, including market choices. Id. at 206.
54. Id. at 205.
55. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 138.
56. A company also must be careful that its prices are not too unreasonable or else it may
lose the goodwill of consumers, prescribing physicians, and third-party payors, which can result
in decreased demand when there are substitutes. GARBER, supra note 29, at 20. Price-setting is
not seriously affected by occasional congressional threats of price regulation probably because
companies perceive that their individual pricing schemes will not affect a congressional decision
to regulate prices. See id. at 31.
57. See supra note 37.
58. See Garber, supra note 29, at 31.
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governmental regulation of pharmaceuticals is to ensure, to the extent
possible, safe and effective drugs and products for public welfare. 9
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations require several phases
of testing before a new drug, product, or process will be approved.'
This process takes an average of two and a half years, leaving a
company only a fraction of the patent period to make a return on its
investment through exclusive marketing before the patent expires and
other companies can compete in producing and selling the product.6'
This testing process may result in safer or more effective drugs, but it
also results in delayed access to needed products.62 The FDA also can
require or encourage a company to withdraw an existing product from
the market.63 The expense of compliance with FDA regulations is
generally reflected in higher prices on products. Despite having what
may seem like burdensome regulations, the FDA is often criticized for
not having strict enough regulations and not enforcing those it does
have.'
3. Product Liability Law
Product liability is one area within the broader law of torts. At least
four functions or goals of tort law have been recognized. First, perhaps
the simplest function of tort law is to enhance corrective justice; that is,
tort law serves to restore the relationship between two parties that
existed until one of the parties unjustly injured the other, thereby
altering the relationship between them.6 5 A second goal is the redress
of social grievances against wrongdoers.' Third, tort law serves to
reallocate risk and compensate victims.67 This function stems from the
idea that it is better for large numbers of people to bear small additional
costs than for a few individuals to suffer severely harsh losses.68 A

59. See id. at 27.
60. See id. at 27-28. For example, to gain FDA approval to begin marketing a new drug,
a company must perform clinical trials, file applications, and produce extensive documentation.
Id. at 27. Only then will the FDA determine whether there is evidence of safety and
effectiveness sufficient to justify marketing the drug. Id. The FDA is the "primary authority" in
pharmaceutical regulation, empowered by the 1962 amendments to the federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. Id.
61. See id. at 28.
62. See id. at 31-32.
63. See id at 89.
64. Id. at 33; DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 29, at 47.
65. 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 24-25.
66. Id. at 26-27.

67. Id. at 28-30.
68. Id. at 28.
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fourth goal of tort law is to prevent future injuries by providing
monetary disincentives to harmful behavior. 9
To achieve these goals, the product liability system requires
individual plaintiffs to bring suits to redress their injuries. The successful plaintiff can win compensatory damages, damages for pain and
suffering, and possibly punitive damages. The direct and indirect costs
incurred by defendant manufacturers as a result of these suits affect the
industry's decisionmaking process."
Decisionmakers base their predictions of cost, risk, and uncertainty
on their own perceptions of the potential for liability.7' Predictions of
substantial liability potential can result in failure or delay in introducing
a new drug into the market, withdrawal of a drug already on the market,
and high prices.72 If a company determines that estimated costs
outweigh the benefits, in other words, that it would not make a profit in
introducing a product into the market, it would most likely decide not
to market it at all." This has the positive effect of preventing injuries
that may be caused by the product.74 However, it also has the negative
consequence of rendering the product unavailable to consumers who
would be willing to accept the risk in exchange for the benefit the
product would provide.'
A new drug may be delayed in order to permit the manufacturer to
do more testing so that better estimates of potential costs can be made.
This results in a delay in availability of products, but the additional
testing and consideration also may lead to modifications in the product
that enhance safety. Unfortunately, sometimes modifications that
increase safety also decrease effectiveness.76
69. Id. at 30-31.
70. Id. at 65. Direct costs include those paid in court judgments and settlements, and in
defending against law suits. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 91. Indirect costs of product-related
injuries are more difficult to define. See id. Adverse product liability judgments play an
important role in triggering FDA action and often provide the impetus for FDA hearings. Id. at
92. In addition, doctors may be less willing to prescribe a certain manufacturer's drug due to
the publicity surrounding product liability actions and their own potential for liability. See id.
Finally, loss of law suits may cause stock prices to drop because of tarnished reputation or fear
of future losses.
71. GARBER, supra note 29, at 101. Different companies often have different perceptions
of identical liability situations depending on their past experience and the degree of risk
averseness of the decisionmakers. Id. at 94. Some objective factors that may lead to a prediction
of substantial liability are widespread use of the product, high background injury rates, and the
potential for jury sympathy. Id.
72. Id. at 81.
73. Id. at 71.
74. See id. at 86-87.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 124. A decrease in dosage level is a simple example of increased safety at the
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Many product withdrawals involve products with potential liability
problems." The cause of withdrawal, however, is difficult to isolate
and in reality is probably a combination of market forces, regulation,
and liability perceptions.78 Withdrawal of a product already on the
market has the same social advantages and disadvantages as failure to
introduce a product into the market.
Product liability affects prices because estimates of future costs are
usually built into the price of a product.79 If the price of a product is
substantially increased, it sometimes exceeds the financial reach of
people who need it. While a price increase due to a threat of product
liability may reduce potential injuries through market forces, because a
high price for a risky product may deter many people from using it, the
alternative may be the use of a less effective product. 0
C. Relative Merits of the Institutions
Market forces successfully deal with product-related injuries because
they are adaptable to product changes, and they can act to prevent
injuries.81 However, that success is limited because market forces only
treat risks perceived in the market, 2 and a completely informed
consumer is an ideal unlikely to be realized.83
Governmental regulation does not adequately deal with all of the
product defects that can arise because of the generalized applicability of
governmental regulations and limited resources for enforcement.84
However, for defects it can regulate, an agency with expertise in this
area would be in the best position to determine the type and severity of
sanction which would best deter future product defects.8 A major
problem with governmental regulation as a sole force acting in the area
of product-related injuries is that it provides no compensation to the

expense of effectiveness. Id. at 124 n.3.

77. Id. at 87.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111. However, contrary to the layperson's expectation, past liability costs (also
called "sunk" costs) are not always recouped by increasing prices of future products if price
increases would conflict with the primary goal of maximizing profits. Id. Nevertheless, past
liability costs may be relevant to future prices because they may indirectly affect current
estimates of future liability costs. Id.
80. Id. at 121.
81. 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 257.

82. Id. at 255-56.
83. Id. at 262.
84. Id. at 257-58.
85. See id. at 256.
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victim,
thereby failing to achieve one of the most valuable goals of tort
86
law.
Tort law itself also does not apply to all risks. If traditional
negligence standards are applied, only those defects for which liability
and causation can be shown in individual cases can be addressed by tort
law. 7 This counteracts the advantages of tort law, which include
providing compensation to injured plaintiffs, adapting well to changes
in products, and dealing more justly (on a case-by-case basis) with very
specific or odd risks than broad-sweeping regulations aimed at more
generalized defects.88
Hence, it is apparent that none of these systems by itself achieves all
of the desired public goals, and all of them have mixed effects on the
pharmaceutical industry and society. Therefore, none of these systems
is sufficiently superior to justify choosing one exclusively over the
others. In addition, although some commentators have proposed
legislative solutions such as compensation schemes, such schemes also
are not perfect in securing all of the values reflected within the body of
tort law.89 Moreover, they have not yet been enacted. In a historically
common law area such as product liability, courts should not refrain
from doing justice in individual cases in the hope that future legislative
action will resolve the issues.
For the present, it seems that the approach to product-related injuries
such as those inflicted by Factor VIII concentrates should consist of
some combination of market forces, governmental regulation, and
product liability law."' First, the advantages of these institutions
complement each other. Second, if these institutions act with awareness
of and in cooperation with each other, they can produce synergistic
effects which enhance the functions of each in achieving the desired
goals. The purpose of the remainder of this Note is to show that the
rationales behind existing product liability theories that relax the
causation requirement apply to Factor VIII and similar cases. Addition86. Id. at 257-58.
87. Id. at 257.
88. Id. at 256.
89. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 20, at 107 (arguing in favor of a compensation scheme for
victims of contaminated blood products which would be funded partly by the industry and partly
by the government). But see Sindell, 607 P.2d at 938 n.30 (stating that in principle it did not

"see any justification for shifting the financial burden for such damages from drug manufacturers

to the taxpayers ..
"). See also Schwartz, supra note 26, at 966 (arguing for a legislative
compensation scheme in mass tort cases in which the defendant who caused the injury cannot
be identified, which would apportion compensation and administration costs among all
manufacturers).
90. 1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 258. "[Ihe tort liability system will continue to be needed
as an umbrella institution to complement the market and regulation." Id. at 204.
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ally, the Note proposes a modified theory of product liability that both
advances the goals of tort law and fosters beneficial interplay of market
forces and governmental regulation.
III.

THEORIES OF LIABiLrrY

A. Concert of Action
The theory of concert comes from the aiding and abetting concept in
criminal law.9 Its purpose is to deter dangerous group schemes and
conduct.92 The classic model for concert is that of an innocent bystander being injured by one of two cars racing each other at excessive
speeds.93 Under concert, the injured person may sue either or both of
the drivers.94 It is not required that there be an express agreement
among the defendants; rather, a "tacit understanding" will suffice to
create liability.95 Each defendant may be held jointly and severally liable
for the injury caused by one of them."
In the area of products liability, one court has applied the concert
theory to a claim for injuries caused by diethylstilbesterol (DES).97
However, most courts have rejected concert claims in DES cases on the
ground that parallel practices and mutual reliance on tests and marketing
techniques fall short of a "tacit agreement."" Likewise, no court has
allowed recovery under this theory in a Factor VIII case.
B. Alternative Liability
The alternative liability theory was adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Summers v. Tice, the facts of which provide an
excellent demonstration of the theory.9 9 In that case, the plaintiff was
injured by one of two defendants when both defendants negligently shot

91.
92.
93.
94.

Smith, 823 P.2d at 726.
Sheiner, supra note 38, at 979.
Id.
Id.
95. KEarON Er AL, supra note 21, at 46.
96. Id. There are two analytical approaches to such a problem which render the resulting
joint and several liability just. Sheiner, supra note 38, at 978. The first treats all defendants
vicariously liable for the injuries caused by one of them on the basis of agency principles. Id.
at 979-80. The second approach asserts that the negligence involved is formulation of and
participation in the plan itself; therefore, the actions of all possible defendants are true causes

of the injury. Id.
97. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984).
98. See, e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
99. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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in the general direction of the plaintiff while all three were huning.00
The plaintiff did not know and could not prove which of the defendants
actually caused the harm. 1 ' The court found that both defendants were
wrongdoers and acted tortiously toward the plaintiff." Therefore, the
court decided that, as a matter of fairness, the burden of proof should
be shifted from the innocent plaintiff to each of the tortious defendants
to show that the defendant was not responsible. 3 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts embodies this principle."
In applying the theory of alternative liability, one issue that often
arises is whether Summers or the Restatement requires that the
defendants' negligent acts occurred simultaneously. Some courts have
held that simultaneity is a requirement, relying on the facts of Summers
itself.0 However, other courts have disagreed, holding that simultaneity is not a sine qua non for application of the theory. 6 In addition,
comment (h) following the Restatement provision expresses that
modification of the provision may be appropriate in the future to meet
as yet unanticipated circumstances. 7

100. Id.
101. Id. at 4-5.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5.
104.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 433(b)(3) (1977). This section provides:

Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has
been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has
not caused the harm.
Id.
105. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 929.

106. Id. at 928. The court in Sindell recognized that simultaneity is but one circumstance
which precludes a plaintiff from explaining which defendant was responsible, but not the only
circumstance precluding such a determination. See id.
107. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(b)(3) cmt. (h) (1965) provides:
The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has been
applied all have been cases in which all of the actors involved have been joined
as defendants. All of these cases have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or
substantially so, and all of them have involved conduct of substantially the same
character, creating substantially the same risk of harm, on the part of each actor.
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule stated
may be necessary because of complications arising from the fact that one of the
actors involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect
of lapse of time, or because of substantial differences in the character of the
conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created. Since such cases have
not arisen, and the situations which might arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt
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Another issue that arises is whether the defendants must be in a
better position than the plaintiff to identify which one of them caused
the harm. This issue was addressed in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,an
influential case involving product liability theories decided by the
California Supreme Court."8 In Sindell, the plaintiff's mother had
taken DES for the purpose of preventing miscarriage while pregnant
with the plaintiff."l The plaintiff developed injuries in her adulthood
as a result of the in vivo exposure."' The plaintiff could not identify
the individual defendant responsible for the injury-causing drug."' The
defendant manufacturers argued that application of the alternative
liability theory (burden-shifting) requires that the defendants be in a
better position to make the causation determination than the plaintiff."' However, the Sindell court stated that neither Summers nor the
Restatement section embodying the Summers principle required such a
showing."'
A third issue that arises in the application of the alternative liability
theory is whether all possible defendants must be joined."' In Summers, there were two possible defendants, and both were joined."5
Although there was only a fifty percent chance that either defendant was
the real cause-in-fact, shifting the burden to the defendants could be
justified on the ground that, because both possible defendants were
joined, the probability that one or the other of them was responsible was
one hundred percent." 6 Therefore, the question is whether shifting the
burden is justified when there is a chance that the responsible tortfeasor
has not been joined and will escape liability."7 There is a split among
the courts as to resolution of this issue as well." 8 In Sindell, the court
refused to allow recovery on the basis of alternative liability in a DES
case because the number of possible defendant manufacturers was
around 200, and therefore they could not all be joined."9
is made to deal with such problems in this Section. The rule stated in Subsection
(3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such situations call for it.
Id.
108. 607 E2d 924 (Cal. 1980).

109. Id. at 925.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 926.
Id. at 926, 931.
Id. at 929.
Id.
See id. at 930-31.
Summers, 199 P.2d at 2.
Sheiner, supra note 38, at 986.
See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
See id.
Id. at 931.
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C. Enterprise Liability
The theory of enterprise liability was first postulated in Hall v. E.L
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 2 The plaintiffs were several children
injured in separate explosions of blasting caps occurring in ten different
states over a four-year period."' The defendants were several blasting
cap manufacturers and their trade association. " No individual manufacturer was linked to any individual injury; rather, the principal cause
of action was the industry's failure to warn and to take safety precautions, which resulted in an unreasonable risk of harm.'2 In Hall, the
plaintiffs presented evidence that (1) each defendant followed an
industry safety standard, (2) manufacturers cooperated in the production
of the blasting caps, and (3) a trade association researched and designed
some of the safety features, including labeling." In light of this
evidence, the court concluded that the defendant manufacturers could be
found to have jointly controlled the risk, and therefore determined that
the plaintiff needed only to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that one of the defendants was responsible for the injury-causing cap in
order for the burden to shift to the defendants to absolve themselves
from liability.'2 5
In Sindell, the plaintiff argued a cause of action under the rationale
of Hall based on "'concerted promulgation and adherence to
industry-wide testing, safety, warning and efficacy standards"' by the
DES manufacturers. 26 In addition, a law review comment cited several
times in the Sindell opinion 27 urged that an industry-wide theory of
liability be applied to DES cases on the basis that promulgation and
adherence to the industry-wide standard was the tortious act resulting in
manufacture of the injury-producing drug, much as the concerted plan
is the tortious act in a concert of action claim." Thus, the conduct of
each defendant was a substantial element contributing to the injury,
which would satisfy the causation requirement. 9 Nevertheless, the
court refused to adopt the enterprise theory for the case before it.)"

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

345 R Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 359, 386.
Id. at 373-76.
Id. at 380.
Sindell 607 P.2d at 934.
See id. at 927-37 (citing Sheiner, supra note 38).
Sheiner, supra note 38, at 997-98.
Id. at 997.
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.
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The Sindell court distinguished Hall on the basis of the total number
of manufacturers.' In Hall, there were six manufacturers comprising
the whole of the industry, whereas in Sindell there were at least 200
manufacturers of DES.' Apparently the court heeded Hall's warning
against applying the theory where there are a large number of manufacturers.' In rejecting this theory, the Sindell court also noted that the
FDA is heavily involved in regulating the testing, manufacturing, and
labelling of drugs." Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be
inequitable to hold a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a drug
it did not produce just because it followed the industry standard. 35
D. Market Share Liability
36
The theory of market share liability was enunciated in Sindell.
It evolved primarily from alternative liability,3 7 but contains one key
difference. Rather than imposing joint and several liability on each
individual manufacturer, it allocates damages according to the percentage market share held by each manufacturer.3 3 The rationale is that
a manufacturer's market share is an estimate of the probability that it
caused an individual plaintiff's injury and that the aggregate amount of
damages paid in all such cases
would approximate the total damages
39
caused by the manufacturer.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378 (stating that enterprise liability would be
"manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small
producers").
134. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.
135. lad
136. Id. at 936. The court acknowledged the duty of courts to be flexible and willing to go
beyond traditional negligence law when justice requires, stating:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and
technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be
traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere
rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or to
fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.
Id.

137. See id. at 936-37.
138. Id. at 937. To illustrate, suppose that a plaintiff sues several defendants for an injury
caused by a defective product, but she cannot identify which manufacturer produced the
particular product. If manufacturer A sold 30% of all such products during the relevant time
period, and the plaintiff were awarded $100,000 in damages, then manufacturer A would owe
$100,000 X .30 = $30,000. See id. n.28.

139. Id. at 937.
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In order to apply the market share theory, the Sindell court required
that a "substantial share" of the market be joined." As such, the
defendant manufacturer's argument that the manufacturer who actually
caused the injury would likely escape liability loses much of its
force. 41 The court did not quantify what constitutes a "substantial
share," but it is apparent that something less than seventy-five percent
of the market would have sufficed, since the court explicitly rejected the
proposal that seventy-five to eighty percent
cited law review comment's
142
should be required.
The court noted that a defendant may absolve itself by showing that
"it could not have made the product which caused the plaintiff's
injuries.""'4 The example the court gave was that of an actual DES
manufacturer in the Sindell case who was dismissed from the suit on
showing that it had not produced any DES before the time that the
plaintiff was born.'"
Although the court acknowledged that the market is difficult to
define, that any determination of market share would likely not be
mathematically accurate, and that the correlation between market share
and probability of liability is not perfect, the court left such issues to be
determined at trial by the factfinder. 45 The court only espoused the
basic tenets of the market share liability theory, which would be enough
to permit a plaintiff to proceed beyond a defendant's summary judgment
motion based on a plaintiff's inability to show causation as to a
particular defendant under a traditional negligence cause of action.
Since the California Supreme Court first adopted market share
liability in Sindell, the highest courts of four other states as well as
some lower courts have adopted it in some form." 6 The Wisconsin

140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 937-38. The Sindell court found support in Sunmers for leaving these issues to
the factfinder, stating:

mhe difficulty of apportioning damages among the defendant producers in exact
relation to their market share does not seriously militate against the rule we adopt.
As we said in Swnmers with regard to the liability of independent tortfeasors,
where a correct division of liability cannot be made "the trier of fact may make it
the best it can."

Id. at 937.
146. In Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984), the Washington Supreme Court
found the Sindell market share theory "conceptually attractive" but rejected it in favor of a
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modified version which it reasoned would more appropriately and specifically characterize
liability and apportion damages. Martin, 689 P.2d at 380. This theory became known as
market-share alternate liability theory. Id. at 381-82.
First, the Martin court noted that Sindell had not defined what a substantial share of the
market would be. Id. at 381. This was important because the Martin court also perceived that
Sindell had been unclear as to whether the defendants representing a substantial share, but less
than 100% of the market, would be liable for 100% of the damages, in other words, whether the
percentage of the market that had been left unaccounted for would be reallocated. Id. at 380-81.
If damages are reallocated, "[t]he lower the percentage of the market that is required to be
joined, the higher will be the distortion," because a larger percentage of the market remains
unalocated. Id. at 381. The court illustrated what it called "inherent distortion" of liability with
a hypothetical example similar to the following: Assume that a plaintiff is awarded damages of
$100,000, and she has joined DES manufacturers comprising 60% of the relevant market. Would
a defendant manufacturer with 20% of the market be responsible for $20,000 or for $20,000 +
(20/60 X 40,000) = $33,333? See id.
Instead, the Martin court proposed that each defendant that could show its market share
would be liable for only that percentage of the damages. Id. at 383. Any defendants unable to
prove their individual market shares would be responsible for equal shares of unaccounted for
damages. Id.
The Washington approach differs from the California approach in other ways. A Washington
plaintiff is not required to join a substantial share of the market, but rather only one defendant.
Id. at 382. The Martincourt perceived no reason for the substantial share requirement since an
individual defendant's liability is based only on the defendant's market share. Id. The
Washington plaintiff would need to allege that the plaintiff's mother used DES and that DES
is the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, that the defendant manufactured or marketed the type of
DES taken by the plaintiff's mother, and that the defendant's conduct constituted a breach of
a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. In showing that the defendant manufactured the type of
DES taken by the mother, the plaintiff would need to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant manufactured DES like the DES the mother took with respect to dosage,
color, size, or other physical characteristics. Id.
In addition, the Martin court limited the defendant's liability by allowing the defendant to
exculpate itself by showing that it did not distribute the drug in the plaintiff's market area. Id.
As in Sindell, the court stated that a defendant may absolve itself by proving that it did not
market DES during the time period that plaintiff's mother could have ingested the drug. Id. at
380, 382.
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), the highest court of New York
applied the market share theory to a DES case. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1077. Unlike in
Martin, the Hymowitz court explicitly selected the national market as the relevant one. Id. The
court expounded several reasons for this choice, including unreliability of smaller than national
scale markets, difficulty in establishing different market figures for every case depending on
different geographical markets, and a need to reduce the burden on litigants. Id. In so holding,
the court attempted to "apportion liability so as to correspond to the over-all culpability of each
defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each defendant created to the public-atlarge." Id. at 1078. Since the court viewed the culpable act as that of marketing the product in
a general sense, this approach prevented what the court perceived as a windfall to a defendant
who sells in a different geographical region than where the injury occurred. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court adopted Washington's market-share alternate theory with a few
modifications in another DES case, Conley v. Boyle Drug, 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990). In
Conley, the court stated that the relevant market should be drawn as narrowly as the evidence
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Supreme Court rejected concert of action, alternative, enterprise, and

allows to increase the likelihood that liability will be allocated to only those defendants who
could have produced the injury causing DES. Id. at 284. In addition, the court stated that the
theory should be restricted to negligence cases and therefore not permitted in strict liability,
warranty or fraud causes of action. Al. at 286. Finally, the plaintiff should be required to show
that she made a good faith effort to identify the manufacturer that actually caused her injury.
Id. In adopting market-share alternate liability in this DES case, the Conley court distinguished
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985), an asbestos case in which the same
court had previously refused to adopt a market share theory.
In King v. Cutter Lab., 685 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the court held that Factor VIII
is more similar to asbestos than to DES and certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question
whether market-share alternate liability as adopted in Conley should apply to Factor VIII cases
in Florida. Id. at 1360. Although there are some similarities between the asbestos cases and
Factor VIl cases, there is one very important difference. Injury due to asbestos exposure is
cumulative, therefore every exposure causes injury. In Celotex, although the plaintiff could not
identify all of the manufacturers of asbestos, he was able to identify some of them. Celotex, 471
So. 2d at 537. In contrast, in Factor VIII and DES cases, one product is responsible for the
injury, and it cannot be identified. This is a crucial distinction in terms of the policy reasons
behind suspending the causation requirement. Without an alternate form of liability in asbestos
cases, the plaintiff still has a remedy: traditional negligence. See id. at 539. Indeed, in Celotex
the court concluded:
[W]e do not find it necessary to accept or reject the market theory approach; rather,
we find that, since Copeland has identified several of the named defendants as
having manufactured the products that caused his injury, this case neither requires
nor justifies the major policy change necessary to adopt the market share theory
in Florida.
Id.
In the same year as Celotex, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the market-share alternate
theory with a few modifications in a Factor VIII case. See Smith, 823 P.2d at 729. The Smith
court stated that the plaintiff should use due diligence to join all manufacturers, but such joinder
was not absolutely required. Id. Rather, the court merely noted that rules as to how many
defendants the plaintiff is required to join are not important as long as the plaintiff knows that
the percentage he can receive depends on the percentage of the market represented by the
defendants. Id. In addition, the court agreed with the Hymowitz court that the national market
was the most appropriate for determining market shares. Id. at 728. Having determined that the
national market would be used, the Smith court acknowledged that probably the only way for
a defendant to exculpate itself is by showing that it did not have the product on the market
during the relevant time period. Id. at 729.
The approach used by the Smith court, like that of the Hymowitz court, is a hybrid of sorts.
The court based liability, at least to some extent, on the enterprise theory, stating "[a]s we are
faced here with a minimal number of manufacturers of the product, we believe that culpability
for marketing the product is a better policy." Id. at 728. However, it apportioned damages on
the basis of market share. Id. at 729. The court implied that both concert of action and enterprise
theories of liability may be applicable, but explicitly stated that it did not want to impose joint
and several liability. Id. at 726-27.
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market share theories of liability in a DES case and instead developed
its own approach based on a comparative fault scheme. 47
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT
SHOULD BE RELAXED

A. Public Policy
There are strong policy reasons why manufacturers of Factor VIII
concentrates should be held liable for the damage caused by their
products. As a result of the contaminated Factor VIII concentrate
products, the victims contracted AIDS, perhaps the most feared disease
of this decade. AIDS is accompanied by a host of devastating symp"' and often elicits social prejudice toward its victims. 49 Unlike
toms 48
heart disease and cancer, for which there are partially successful
life-saving treatments or surgeries, AIDS is a death sentence for every
person who contracts it."s Although there are medications that can
extend the life of the victims, these are relatively new and are very
expensive.' Recovery in product liability suits can provide the means
to obtain these drugs and medical care, and can ease financial suffering
that results from inability to work.

147. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984). In Collins, the court held that
a plaintiff could recover all of her damages from one defendant if the plaintiff could show that
the plaintiff's mother took DES, that DES was the cause of her injuries, that the defendant
produced the type of DES taken by the plaintiff's mother, and that the defendant breached a duty
to the plaintiff in producing and marketing the DES. Id. at 50. However, if the plaintiff joined
more than one defendant, the damages would be apportioned by the jury on the basis of
comparative fault where the percentage fault would be a function of a number of factors,
including market share, the extent to which the company tested the product, and whether the
company marketed the product after it was aware of the risks. Id. at 53.
148. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
149. See Michael M. Merson, Returning Home: Reflections on the USA'S Response to the
HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 347 THE LANCET 1673, 1673 (1996).
150. AIDS is currently the leading cause of death for 25-44 year-olds in America. Id.
151. Id. at 1674:
[Flew Americans seem to realise [sic] the difficulties that many HIV-positive
persons have in gaining access to these expensive drugs. There seems to be an all
too common scenario. AIDS patients lose their job either because they can no
longer work or are fired. In losing their job they lose their health insurance....
They then spend their remaining assets and savings to purchase the drugs and the
care they need.
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Because blood shield statutes preclude strict liability claims, victims
have no remedy except through a 'negligence cause of action."
Plaintiffs usually cannot recover under negligence in Factor VIII
concentrate cases because they cannot show causation, in other words,
which defendant caused the plaintiff's harm." However, the individual causation requirement would be suspended if one of the four theories
discussed in the previous section apply. The problem is that courts have
been reluctant to expand these doctrines for fear that it would affect
drug innovation, availability, and prices and international competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry.
It cannot be denied that these are valid concerns. However, research
indicates that doctrinal expansions such as strict liability and market
share theories do not seriously affect the pharmaceutical industry's
decisionmaking process." 4 While these doctrines may remove barriers
to bringing suit resulting in a rise in litigation, there is evidence that for
every suit brought there are many injuries caused by negligence for
which people do not bring suit. In thinking about reform, it should
be remembered that the primary goal of tort law is to encourage people
injured by another's negligence to bring suit in order to obtain corrective
justice, provide just compensation, and deter future product-related
injuries. 56
Moreover, it is not a general rise in the number of suits brought but
rather an increase of extremely large awards, including pain and
suffering and punitive damages, that inject the most uncertainty into the
decisionmaking process.5 7 As previously discussed, it is uncertainty,
rather than risk, that most influences industrial decisionmakers and
insurers, resulting in adverse social consequences.'58
In addition, the strict causation requirement in traditional negligence
law has been cited as a shortcoming in product liability law as a system
for achieving the interests at stake in product-related injury cases,
because it limits the number of product defects that can be addressed by
courts. 9 Finally, doctrinal expansion in product liability law can
enhance the function of market forces and governmental regulation in
achieving the same interests.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Klein, supra note 20, at 109-10.
See, e.g., King, 685 So. 2d at 1359.
1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 20.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 24, 28, 31.
Id. at 66, 99.
See supra pt. II.
1 A.L.I., supra note 27, at 257.
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B. Legal "Fit"
In order for there to be liability under the concert of action theory,
the defendants must have had a "tacit agreement" to engage in tortious
acts."W Although the Factor VIII manufacturers likely engaged in
parallel practices with respect to testing and marketing, 161 the Sindell
court and other courts have held that this alone does not rise to the level
of concert of action, partly because the conduct itself is not tortious 62
However, there is also evidence of anticompetitive behavior within the
pharmaceutical industry, and indeed within the Factor VIII concentrate
submarket itself. 63 At the very least such conduct would undermine
market forces, preventing people from making informed choices about
risk, price, and alternatives. Such practices could potentially violate
antitrust law."6 Thus, such conduct, in addition to the parallel practices in safety and marketing, may rise to a level that would satisfy the
concert theory. If so, liability would attach because of the conspiracy
itself, and it would not matter which individual member of the group
actually caused the harm.6'
Under the alternative theory of liability, the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant manufacturers to exculpate themselves after the plaintiff
shows that all defendant manufacturers were negligent and that the
plaintiff cannot show which manufacturer caused the harm."6 In Factor
VIII cases, it is known that all manufacturers had HIV-contaminated
Factor VIII concentrates on the market. 67 In addition, all of the
manufacturers engaged in basically the same inadequate procedures in

160. See supra pt. Ill.
161. See Sheiner, supra note 38, at 980 (suggesting that the pharmaceutical industry's
production and marketing strategies involve cooperative conduct which supports application of
the concert of action theory).
162. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932.
163. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
164. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND
ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 125 (2d ed. 1994). Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful
"[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
This provision requires some kind of concerted action or meeting of the minds, but "conscious
parallelism" without express agreement may constitute an antitrust violation if certain other "plus
factors" are present. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra,at 128-29. Three of these "plus factors" are
present in Factor VIII cases: (1) each defendant had a "substantial profit motive for concerted
action," (2) the defendant engaged in "unanimity of action," and (3) compliance with the
concerted plan would benefit individual defendants only if all of the defendants also cooperated.
Id. at 129.
165. See supra pt. III.
166. See supra pt. III.
167. King, 685 So. 2d at 1360.
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manufacturing the plasma concentrate.' 68 Therefore, the manufacturers
were all potentially negligent with respect to the users of their products.
The second requirement for application of the alternative theory is
also met in Factor VIII cases because the plaintiffs can rarely show
which defendant caused the harm for three reasons. First, Factor VIII
products were interchangeable."6 The plaintiff usually would get the
concentrate from a hospital or doctor, and he would be given whichever
manufacturer's concentrates were available. Second, although many of
the manufacturers' names were on the plasma bags, the plaintiff may not
remember the names because it is often a long period of time between
when the product was used and when the plaintiff realizes that he is
infected and brings suit.17 Indeed, sometimes it is the family of the
victim that brings suit after the victim is deceased.' Third, if the
plaintiff used the products of more than one manufacturer, he cannot
show which one caused the harm even if he knows which
manufacturers' products he used."7 Because hemophiliacs have to
repeat treatments often, many of them used different manufacturers'
products.
As previously discussed, there is some question as to whether
application of the alternative liability theory requires that (1) the
defendants are in a better position to determine which of them caused
the plaintiff's injury and (2) all of the potential defendants are
joined.1 73 In Sindell, the California Supreme Court explicitly stated that
neither Summers nor the Restatement section 433(b) requires that the
defendants be in a better position to determine which defendant caused
the harm. 7 Therefore, it should not matter if the defendant manufacturers of Factor VIII concentrates did not have better access to
information than the plaintiff. Rather, the policy is simply that as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should
bear the burden of persuasion."As to the second issue, the majority of courts considering application
of alternative liability theory have required joinder of all possible

168. Ray v. Cutter Lab., 754 F. Supp. 193, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Brief of Arnicus Curiae
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers in Support of Appellant at 9, King v. Cutter Lab., 685 So.
2d at 1358.
169. Ray, 754 F Supp. at 196.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., King, 685 So. 2d at 1359.
172. Ray, 754 F Supp. at 196.
173. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 929-31.
174. Id. at 930.
175. See supra pt. III.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss2/2

28

Bohannan: Product Liability: A Public Policy Approach to Contaminated Facto
FACTOR VIII BLOOD PRODUCTS

defendants. 76 However, strict adherence to this requirement may not
preclude recovery in Factor VIII cases because there are so few potential
defendants," especially if those who could not have supplied the
injury-causing drug in the plaintiff's geographical region are omitted.
Alternatively, relaxation of this requirement in Factor VIII cases would
result in less unfairness to defendants than in DES cases because there
are very few Factor VIII manufacturers in contrast to the 200 to 300
DES manufacturers.
Under enterprise liability theory, the plaintiff must show that the
defendants jointly controlled the risk."' This theory is partly based on
the concert of action theory, but it was specifically adopted in a product
liability setting. Although it has not been widely accepted, both DES
and Factor VIII courts continue to consider it in their analysis of which
of the possible theories should apply.'79 In Sindell, the sole reason
given by the court for rejecting the enterprise theory in that DES case
was that the Hall court, which developed the theory, had cautioned
against applying it in cases in which the enterprise consisted of a large
number of manufacturers. 8 ' The Hall court's concern was that the
more manufacturers there are, the less likely it seems that all manufacturers could have known of the risk and participated in setting and
executing the inadequate safety standard.' However, in Factor VIII
cases, the enterprise is much smaller than the DES enterprise. In fact,
there have been only about six manufacturers of Factor VIII concentrates, about the same as the number of blasting cap manufacturers in
Hall.' The existence of a small number of manufacturers, combined
with the collusive and parallel practices in the market discussed herein
with respect to the concert theory, favors the application of enterprise
liability in Factor VIII cases.
Under market share theory, the primary issue in Factor VIII cases is
whether the products were "fungible" within the meaning of Sindell and
other cases that have applied the market share theory.'83 Arguably, the
Factor VIII product is fungible according to the dictionary definition,

176. See Smith, 823 P.2d at 725.
177. See, e.g., Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 696 F. Supp. 351, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(applying alternative liability in a Factor VIII case in which plaintiff had joined all potential
defendants).
178. See supra pt. I1.
179. See, e.g., Sindel, 607 P.2d at 924.
180. Id. at 935.
181. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378.
182. Id. at 359.
183. See Sindell 607 P.2d at 936.
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which gives "interchangeable" as a synonym.' 4 Like DES, Factor VIII
products were interchangeable with respect to their function: the
products were produced by similar processes, any patient could have
been given any manufacturer's product, and each product performed the
same function in the same way."5
However, defendants in these cases argue that the products were not
uniform with respect to risk because a product was only defective if the
source plasma was contaminated with HIV 6 There are two reasons
why this distinction should not be dispositive. First, it seems that all of
the manufacturers followed basically the same preparation procedures." 7 If a particular concentrate product was not contaminated with
HIV, it was the result of chance, not the result of better procedures
followed by some manufacturers and not by others.' Thus, barring a
claim because of the plaintiff's inability to show causation by any one
manufacturer results in a windfall for all manufacturers. Second, it is
important to note that the claims in these cases are usually for negligence in failure to exclude high-risk donors, failure to screen other
donors, and failure to warn, as opposed to claims for manufacturing or
design defects.8 9 The known nonuniformity of source plasma, which
resulted from some donors being infected but not others, is precisely the
factor that placed a duty on the defendants to exclude high-risk donors,
screen other donors, and warn of the risk involved in using the
concentrate. Thus, the fact that the infectiousness of the source plasma
was nonuniform actually enhances the negligence claims.
However, probably due to fear of doctrinal expansion, most courts
have given the term "fungible" a very narrow reading, which almost
limits the theory to DES cases only."9 Unfortunately, this interpreta-

184.

MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIC1I7ONARY

473 (10th ed. 1993).

185. See Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196.
186. See, e.g., King, 685 So. 2d at 1360.
187. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196.
188. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers in Support of
Appellant at 9, King, 685 So. 2d at 1358.
189. See Smith, 823 P.2d at 717.
190. See, e.g., King, 685 So. "2dat 1359-60. But see Fibreboard Corp. v. Kerness, 625 So.
2d 457 (Fla. 1993). In Fibreboard,the Florida Supreme Court stated,
[The defendant] nevertheless argues that we should apply Conley only to DES
(diethylstilbestrol) cases. We decline to adopt a rule of law based on the type of
product at issue. There is no basis in logic for a special rule based on particular
types of products; such a rule would be arbitrary by its very nature.
Id. at 458.
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tion severely and unnecessarily limits the scope of product liability law
as a system for redressing injuries caused by product defects.
Based on the foregoing analysis, any one of these four theories may
be an appropriate basis for liability in Factor VIII cases.19 ' Having
discussed the policy reasons for relaxing or shifting the causation burden
and the legal avenues through which this can be achieved, it is now
necessary to focus on other aspects of the approach to these cases which
will help to protect the other values at stake.
V. PROPOSALS
The following recommendations apply to Factor VIII and similar
cases regardless of which of the above four theories are used to
determine liability.
A. Market Share versus Joint and
Several Liability
Market share and joint and several liability both accomplish certain
goals, but a modified market share approach is preferable for apportioning damages. The proposed approach involves a comparative fault
scheme. The market share percentage should be one element of a
comparative fault calculation. The other element should be the relative

191. Some defendants would argue that the manufacturers were not negligent toward the
particular plaintiff who has brought suit, and that under the reasoning of Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), "negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." Palsgraf,162
N.E. at 99 (quoting POLLOCK, TORTS 455 (11th ed.)). There are two flaws in this reasoning.
First, it confuses the negligence elements of causation and breach of duty. It is circular to say
that a particular defendant could not have breached a duty toward the plaintiff because the
plaintiff cannot prove that it was that particular defendant who caused the injury. Rather than
intermingling causation issues, purely deductive reasoning can and should be used to determine
if there has been a breach of duty: If a drug manufacturer has breached a duty by manufacturing
a defective product, then it has breached a duty to all potential users of the product. If the
manufacturer has breached a duty to all the potential users, then it necessarily has breached a
duty to one of those users. Second, reliance on Palsgraf in this situation is misplaced. In
Palsgraf,the plaintiff was standing on the defendant railroad's platform after buying a train
ticket. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99. As one of the defendant's guards was helping a passenger to
board a moving train, the passenger's package of fireworks fell from his arms and exploded,
causing some platform scales to fall and injure the plaintiff. Id. Justice Cardozo, writing for the
majority, said that the defendant railroad was not liable because, while the guard's conduct may
have been negligent with respect to the passenger, it was not negligent with respect to the
plaintiff. Id. Palsgrafhas been widely interpreted as standing for the proposition that a duty is
owed only to foreseeable plaintiffs. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS
PROCESS 365-72 (4th ed. 1994). The consumers of a manufacturer's products are like the train's
passengers in Palsgraf,not merely bystanders. Thus, pharmaceutical consumers are foreseeable
plaintiffs.
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degree of negligence of each manufacturer, for example, what safety
precautions were taken by each manufacturer with respect to the
others."9 This approach takes into account the fact that if one defendant was more careful than the others, then the probability that it caused
the harm would likely be less than the percentage of its market share.
The jury could determine these percentages by means of a special
interrogatory form as in other comparative fault cases.
This is a "carrot" approach, providing pharmaceutical companies
with an incentive to engage in more socially advantageous conduct.
Because there is a negligence factor involved in calculating damages,
there would be an incentive to invest in additional safety precautions,
resulting in safer products.'93 This approach also would reduce uncertainty for decisionmakers and insurers because the manufacturer would
know the approximate percentage of its market share and could estimate
potential liability costs.
Furthermore, if individual companies have sufficient incentive to
produce safer products than their competitors, there will be less
collusion and more competition in the market.'94 Market forces will act
more closely to expectation, perhaps resulting in lower prices and
greater availability of products according to demand and competition
rather than according to unethical and perhaps illegal mutual agreements
among pharmaceutical manufacturers.195
Finally, because adherence to regulations by. each defendant would
be a factor in the comparative negligence calculation, this scheme would
provide an additional incentive for companies to comply with regulations.'96 This would enhance the role of governmental regulation in
ensuring safe and effective products for the public. Thus, the market
share approach would promote the harmonious interaction of the
relevant institutions to the benefit of consumers.
Conversely, joint and several liability is the "stick" approach.
Because one manufacturer could be held totally liable for all damages

192. This can be implemented in two ways. The Wisconsin approach, in which market
share percentage and other negligence factors are all considered together by the jury in
calculating a single comparative fault percentage, is one possibility. See supra note 149 and
accompanying text. The second possible approach is to have the jury calculate the comparative
negligence percentage separately from market share, and then assign a certain weight to each
of these elements in determining the overall comparative fault and corresponding damages. A
court might prefer the latter for limiting jury discretion in Factor VIII cases because the jury is
likely to be very sympathetic.
193. See supra pt. II.
194. See supra note 29.
195. See supra pt. II.
196. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 125.
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caused by the others, joint and several liability acts as a deterrent
against engaging in the conduct that triggers its application. However,
joint and several liability may inject too much uncertainty into the
decisionmaking processes of both the pharmaceutical and insurance
industries, resulting in decisions based on fear rather than facts.
Unwarranted predictions of substantial liability might lead to unavailability and high prices of drugs. 9
In addition, because some companies are not amenable to suit due to
personal jurisdiction or successor liability problems, only a few of the
companies involved may be held liable for all of the damages under
joint and several liability. This can result in companies going bankrupt,
leaving virtual monopolies and even less competition.'98 Therefore, the
joint and several approach is less preferable than the market share
approach.
B. Pain and Suffering Awards
Pain and suffering awards should be limited. This proposal can be
justified for three reasons. First, the possibility of large pain and
suffering awards is a primary source of uncertainty for decisionmakers
and insurers, resulting in poor decisions with adverse social consequences."' Second, it is generally acknowledged that monetary awards do
not really alleviate pain and suffering caused by an injury beyond what
compensatory damages would provide, such as medical care. Third, the
plaintiff's injury often has been caused by a product which provided
relief for an ailment that the plaintiff suffered prior to the use of the
product. This is certainly true in Factor VIII cases. Thus, the pain and
suffering award should reflect the difference between the plaintiff's level
of pain and suffering and quality of life subject to the adverse effects of
the product and the level the plaintiff would have experienced due to the
previous ailment without the drug.
However, in Factor VIII cases all of the hemophiliacs infected by the
concentrates eventually die because there is no cure for AIDS. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the relative value of the new treatment
because it requires comparing life with the possibility of pain and
suffering without this drug to no life at all after use of the negligently
manufactured drug. The jury must deal with this philosophically
nebulous dilemma as it deals with similar decisions regarding damages
for the loss of life.

197. See supra pt. II.
198. See GARBER, supra note 29, at 114.
199. See I A.L.I., supra note 27, at 99, 201.
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C. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages also should be limited. The purposes of punitive
damages are to punish wrongful behavior and deter similar future
behavior.2" Also referred to as exemplary or vindictive damages,
punitive damages are those awarded in excess of the actual loss of the
plaintiff when the loss is exacerbated by malicious, wanton, or reckless
behavior on the part of the defendant."' These damages perform their
deterrent function by increasing the risk estimates and uncertainty in
decisionmaking.2° However, punitive damages may deter more than
is socially beneficial or reasonable.
It must be remembered that often even drugs that cause harmful side
effects to some users also give relief to a great number of others. Many
people would accept a risk of harm knowingly in order to obtain relief
from an existing ailment, especially if their existing ailment is serious.
It is important to allow individuals to make informed choices about the
use of drugs or products rather than to preempt those choices by
deterring pharmaceutical companies from producing the drugs or
products altogether. Therefore, in addition to the traditional consideration of the extent of a defendant's knowledge about the risks involved
in using a product, the following factors should be considered in
determining whether punitive damages are appropriate.
First, in determining whether punitive damages should be awarded,
the jury should consider whether adequate warning was given and to
what extent the defendant's behavior prevented market forces from
acting. Second, the positive effects of the drug or product and whether
there was a viable alternative should also be taken into account. If the
overall social benefit to be derived from a drug is greater than the
accompanying social detriment, the manufacturer should be able to put
the product on the market with proper warning for consumers to make
their own decisions. In addition, society probably would not condone a
manufacturer's withholding a life-saving drug, even a risky one, where
there is no alternative. Third, if modifications to the drug would have
made it safer, the extent to which such modifications would have
reduced its effectiveness for the intended purpose also should be
considered.
In Factor VIII cases, some of these factors militate in favor of
punitive damages. First, one of the allegations is that manufacturers

200. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A), at 28

(3d ed. 1995).
201. Id. at 25.
202. See supra note 54.
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failed to provide adequate warning. 3 Second, there is evidence of
collusion in the market, which would prevent market forces from acting
correctly. 2° Third, modifications that would have made the concentrate
safer, such as excluding high-risk donors and screening other donors,
would not have made the concentrate less effective. On the other hand,
the fact that very little was known about AJDS and its modes of
transmission at the time the drug was introduced and for some time
thereafter indicates that the manufacturers probably were not acting
maliciously.2 5 In addition, the concentrate provided great benefits for
hemophiliacs over the cryoprecipitate alternative, and it is likely that at
least some hemophiliacs would have accepted what was perceived at the
time as a slight risk in order to obtain the relief and freedom that the
concentrate afforded them. Therefore, punitive damages may be
appropriate in Factor VIII cases, but they should be limited.
VI. CONCLUSION

Balancing conflicting interests is one of the most difficult and
imperfect of tasks performed by courts and legislatures. However, the
complete sacrifice of a few innocent persons for the benefit of many has
never been an acceptable way to meet this challenge. In Factor VIII
cases, courts must balance the interests of HIV-infected hemophiliacs,
the pharmaceutical industry, and the public .that depends on the
availability of pharmaceutical products. As argued in this Note, this can
be achieved by using a market-share liability approach which factors in
the relative negligence of manufacturers and limits the available
damages. This approach promotes socially beneficial outcomes by
influencing the industrial decisionmaking process and enhancing the
function of market forces and governmental regulation. In this way, tort
law can meet the challenges posed by a progressive society while
protecting the values it has secured for individuals for over a century.

203. See, e.g., Smith, 823 P.2d at 724.
204. See supra note 29.
205. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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